



## **Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis**

Project:

Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output

Customer:

PR electronics A/S

Rønde

Denmark

Contract No.: PR electronics A/S 18/10-076-C

Report No.: PR electronics A/S 18/10-076-C R030

Version V1, Revision R1; January 2026

Philipp Hanzik

## Management summary

This report summarizes the results of the hardware assessment carried out on the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output and product version V01.xx.xx. Table 1 gives an overview of the considered variants.

The hardware assessment consists of a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA). A FMEDA is one of the steps taken to achieve functional safety assessment of a device per IEC 61508. From the FMEDA, failure rates are determined and consequently the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) can be calculated for a subsystem. For full assessment purposes all requirements of IEC 61508 must be considered.

**Table 1: Overview of the considered variants**

	Description	Suffix	HART
[V1]	DIN rail mounted 2w programmable temperature transmitters	6437x1Sx <sup>1</sup>	5 and 7
		6437x2Sx <sup>1</sup>	5 and 7
		6437x3Sx <sup>1</sup>	5 and 7

For safety applications only the described variants of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output have been considered. All other possible variants and configurations are not covered by this report.

The failure modes used in this analysis are from the *exida* Electrical Component Reliability Handbook (see [N2]). The failure rates used in this analysis are the basic failure rates from the Siemens standard SN 29500 (see [N3]). This failure rate database is specified in the safety requirements specification from PR electronics A/S for the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output.

The Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output can be considered to be Type B<sup>1</sup> elements with a hardware fault tolerance of 0.

The configurations that were considered for the FMEDA are “single”, “redundant” and “dual”.

### Single:

Only one sensor is measured, the signal is evaluated to control the current output. In case of device variants with two inputs, one of the inputs is not used.

### Dual:

Two sensors are measured. The evaluation of the signals includes a mathematical combination such as difference of two temperatures. The result of the evaluation is used to control the output.

### Redundant:

Two sensors are measured and evaluated. The two results are compared; the output is set to the safe state if the difference between the evaluated values exceeds a defined lim

<sup>1</sup> Type B element: “Complex” subsystem (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2.

The following tables show how the above stated requirements are fulfilled for the considered Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output.

**Table 2: Summary - Failure rates for PR6437 with single sensor configuration**

Failure category	IEC 61508:2010 <sup>2</sup> Failure rates (in FIT)
<b>Safe Detected (<math>\lambda_{SD}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Safe Undetected (<math>\lambda_{SU}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dangerous Detected (<math>\lambda_{DD}</math>)</b>	<b>452</b>
Dangerous Detected ( $\lambda_{dd}$ ); by internal diagnostics or indirectly <sup>3</sup>	369
High ( $\lambda_H$ ); detected by the logic solver	17
Low ( $\lambda_L$ ); detected by the logic solver	49
Annunciation Detected ( $\lambda_{AD}$ )	17
<b>Dangerous Undetected (<math>\lambda_{DU}</math>)</b>	<b>28</b>
Annunciation Undetected ( $\lambda_{AU}$ )	11
No effect ( $\lambda_{\#}$ )	216
No part ( $\lambda_{-}$ )	289
<b>Total failure rate of the safety function (<math>\lambda_{Total}</math>)</b>	<b>481</b>
<b>Safe failure fraction (SFF) <sup>4</sup></b>	<b>94%</b>
<b>DC</b>	<b>94%</b>
<b>SIL AC <sup>5</sup></b>	<b>SIL 2</b>

<sup>2</sup> It is assumed that practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDAs.

<sup>3</sup> "indirectly" means that these failures are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

<sup>4</sup> The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number listed is for reference only.

<sup>5</sup> SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety function can fulfill the required PFD<sub>AVG</sub> / PFH value.

**Table 3: Summary - Failure rates for PR6437 with redundant sensor configuration**

Failure category	IEC 61508:2010 <sup>6</sup> Failure rates (in FIT)
<b>Safe Detected (<math>\lambda_{SD}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Safe Undetected (<math>\lambda_{SU}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dangerous Detected (<math>\lambda_{DD}</math>)</b>	<b>495</b>
Dangerous Detected ( $\lambda_{dd}$ ); by internal diagnostics or indirectly <sup>7</sup>	410
High ( $\lambda_H$ ); detected by the logic solver	17
Low ( $\lambda_L$ ); detected by the logic solver	49
Annunciation Detected ( $\lambda_{AD}$ )	20
<b>Dangerous Undetected (<math>\lambda_{DU}</math>)</b>	<b>23</b>
Annunciation Undetected ( $\lambda_{AU}$ )	12
No effect ( $\lambda_{\#}$ )	269
No part ( $\lambda_{-}$ )	197
<b>Total failure rate of the safety function (<math>\lambda_{Total}</math>)</b>	<b>519</b>
<b>Safe failure fraction (SFF)<sup>8</sup></b>	<b>95%</b>
<b>DC</b>	<b>95%</b>
<b>SIL AC<sup>9</sup></b>	<b>SIL 2</b>

<sup>6</sup> It is assumed that practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDAs.

<sup>7</sup> "indirectly" means that these failures are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

<sup>8</sup> The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number listed is for reference only.

<sup>9</sup> SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety function can fulfill the required PFD<sub>AVG</sub> / PFH value.

**Table 4: Summary - Failure rates for PR6437 with dual sensor configuration**

Failure category	IEC 61508:2010 <sup>10</sup> Failure rates (in FIT)
<b>Safe Detected (<math>\lambda_{SD}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Safe Undetected (<math>\lambda_{SU}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dangerous Detected (<math>\lambda_{DD}</math>)</b>	<b>472</b>
Dangerous Detected ( $\lambda_{dd}$ ); by internal diagnostics or indirectly <sup>11</sup>	386
High ( $\lambda_H$ ); detected by the logic solver	17
Low ( $\lambda_L$ ); detected by the logic solver	49
Annunciation Detected ( $\lambda_{AD}$ )	20
<b>Dangerous Undetected (<math>\lambda_{DU}</math>)</b>	<b>34</b>
Annunciation Undetected ( $\lambda_{AU}$ )	11
No effect ( $\lambda_{\#}$ )	258
No part ( $\lambda_{-}$ )	218
<b>Total failure rate of the safety function (<math>\lambda_{Total}</math>)</b>	<b>506</b>
<b>Safe failure fraction (SFF) <sup>12</sup></b>	<b>93%</b>
<b>DC</b>	<b>93%</b>
<b>SIL AC <sup>13</sup></b>	<b>SIL 2</b>

The failure rates are valid for the useful life of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output (see Appendix A) when operating as defined in the considered scenarios.

<sup>10</sup> It is assumed that practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDAs.

<sup>11</sup> "indirectly" means that these failures are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

<sup>12</sup> The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number listed is for reference only.

<sup>13</sup> SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety function can fulfill the required PFD<sub>AVG</sub> / PFH value.

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## 1 Purpose and Scope

This document shall describe the results of the hardware assessment carried out on the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output and product version V01.xx.xx. The FMEDA builds the basis for an evaluation whether an element including the described Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output meets the average Probability of Failure on Demand ( $PFD_{AVG}$ ) / Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour (PFH) requirements and if applicable the architectural constraints / minimum hardware fault tolerance requirements per IEC 61508 / IEC 61511. It **does not** consider any calculations necessary for proving intrinsic safety.

## 2 Project management

### 2.1 *exida*

*exida* is one of the world's leading accredited Certification Bodies and knowledge companies, specializing in automation system safety cybersecurity, and availability with over 400 years of cumulative experience in functional safety. Founded by several of the world's top reliability and safety experts from assessment organizations and manufacturers, *exida* is a global company with offices around the world. *exida* offers training, coaching, project oriented system consulting services, safety lifecycle engineering tools, detailed product assurance, cyber-security and functional safety certification, and a collection of on-line safety and reliability resources. *exida* maintains a comprehensive failure rate and failure mode database on process equipment based on 250 billion unit operating hours of field failure data.

### 2.2 Roles of the parties involved

PR electronics A/S

Manufacturer of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output.

*exidast*

Performed the hardware assessment.

PR electronics A/S contracted *exida* in April 2016 with the FMEDA and in October 2019 with the update of the FMEDA of the above mentioned device.

## 2.3 Standards / Literature used

The services delivered by *exida* were performed based on the following standards / literature.

[N1]	IEC 61508-2:2010	Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems
[N2]	Electrical Component Reliability Handbook, 3rd Edition, 2012	<i>exida</i> LLC, Electrical Component Reliability Handbook, Third Edition, 2012, ISBN 978-1-934977-04-0
[N3]	SN 29500-1:01.2004 SN 29500-1 H1:07.2013 SN 29500-2:09.2010 SN 29500-3:06.2009 SN 29500-4:03.2004 SN 29500-5:06.2004 SN 29500-7:11.2005 SN 29500-9:11.2005 SN 29500-10:12.2005 SN 29500-11:07.2013 SN 29500-12:02.2008 SN 29500-15:07.2009 SN 29500-16:08.2010	Siemens standard with failure rates for components
[N4]	Goble, W.M. 2010	Control Systems Safety Evaluation and Reliability, 3rd edition, ISA, ISBN 978-1-934394-80-9. Reference on FMEDA methods
[N5]	Scaling the Three Barriers, Recorded Web Seminar, June 2013,	Scaling the Three Barriers, Recorded Web Seminar, June 2013, <a href="http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/SIF-Verification-Scaling-the-Three-Barriers">http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/SIF-Verification-Scaling-the-Three-Barriers</a>
[N6]	Meeting Architecture Constraints in SIF Design, Recorded Web Seminar, March 2013	<a href="http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/Meeting-Architecture-Constraints-in-SIF-Design">http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/Meeting-Architecture-Constraints-in-SIF-Design</a>

## 2.4 *exida* tools used

[T1]	SILcal V8.0.11	FMEDA Tool
[T2]	exSILentia Ultimate V3.7.2.1122	SIL Verification Tool

## 2.5 Reference documents

### 2.5.1 Documentation provided by the customer

[D1]	6437V101_UK.pdf	Product manual 6437 2-wire HART 7 temperature transmitter
[D2]	5435_5437_6437 Safety Manual_V3R8.docx	Preliminary Safety Manual, V3R8 date 2019-11-21
[D3]	6437-1-03-PDF_V3R0.pdf	Schematic PCB Documentation, V3R0, dated 2019-09-17
[D4]	6437SMD2__2007.pdf	Part List / Bill of Material, _2007, dated 2019-10-03
[D5]	5300NP Product Version Log V01.00.xlsx	

The list above only means that the referenced documents were provided as basis for the FMEDA but it does not mean that *exida* checked the correctness and completeness of these documents.

### 2.5.2 Documentation generated by the customer and *exida*

[R1]	FMEDA - 6437 - Dual RTD V1R12 of 20.05.2020
[R2]	FMEDA - 6437 - Dual TC, with External CJC V1R12 of 20.05.2020
[R3]	FMEDA - 6437 - Dual TC, with Int CJC (Sensor drift) V1R12 of 20.05.2020
[R4]	FMEDA - 6437 - Dual TC, with Int CJC V1R12 of 20.05.2020
[R5]	FMEDA - 6437 - Single TC, with Int CJC V1R12 of 20.05.2020
[R6]	Change log for FMEDAs after first FMEDA Report.docx


### 3 Product Description

The Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output is a rail mounted 2 wire transmitter. The input is galvanically isolated from the 4-20mA output. The devices can be configured via a control panel attached to an extension port or external devices using HART or loop link protocol. The Transmitter can be considered as a Type B<sup>14</sup> element with a hardware fault tolerance of 0.

The safety function of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output is defined as follows:

Conversion of voltage signals, potentiometer, linear resistance, RTD sensor signals or thermocouple sensor signals in hazardous areas to the output signal within specified accuracy.

Figure 2 shows the block diagram of PR6437 device in single sensor configuration and Figure 1 shows the block diagram of PR6437 in dual or redundant sensor configuration.



**Figure 2: Block Diagram of PR6437 in single sensor configuration**

<sup>14</sup> Type B element: "Complex" subsystem (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2.




Figure 3: Block Diagram of PR6437 in dual or redundant configuration

## 4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis

The Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was done together with and is documented in [R1] to [R5].

### 4.1 Description of the failure categories

In order to judge the failure behavior of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output, the following definitions for the failure of the product were considered.

Fail-Safe State	The fail-safe state is defined as output reaching the user defined threshold value.
Fail Safe	A safe failure (S) is defined as a failure that plays a part in implementing the safety function that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) results in the spurious operation of the safety function to put the EUC (or part thereof) into a safe state or maintain a safe state; or,</li><li>b) increases the probability of the spurious operation of the safety function to put the EUC (or part thereof) into a safe state or maintain a safe state.</li></ul>
Fail Dangerous	A dangerous failure (D) is defined as a failure that plays a part in implementing the safety function that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) deviates the output current by more than 2% of full span and prevents a safety function from operating when required (demand mode) or causes a safety function to fail (continuous mode) such that the EUC is put into a hazardous or potentially hazardous state; or,</li><li>b) decreases the probability that the safety function operates correctly when required.</li></ul>
Dangerous Undetected	Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed.
Dangerous Detected	Failure that is dangerous but is detected by internal or external testing.
Fail high	A fail high failure (H) is defined as a failure that causes the output signal to go to the maximum output current (> 21mA).
Fail low	A fail low failure (L) is defined as a failure that causes the output signal to go to the minimum output current (< 3.6mA).
Annunciation	Failure that does not directly impact safety but does impact the ability to detect a future fault (such as a fault in a diagnostic circuit). Annunciation failures are divided into annunciation detected (AD) and annunciation undetected (AU) failures.
No effect	Failure mode of a component that plays a part in implementing the safety function but is neither a safe failure nor a dangerous failure.
No part	Component that plays no part in implementing the safety function but is part of the circuit diagram and is listed for completeness.

## 4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates

### 4.2.1 FMEDA

A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate the effects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure, and to document the system in consideration.

An FMEDA (Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis) is an FMEA extension. It combines standard FMEA techniques with extension to identify online diagnostics techniques and the failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design. It is a technique recommended to generate failure rates for each important category (safe detected, safe undetected, dangerous detected, dangerous undetected, fail high, fail low) in the safety models. The format for the FMEDA is an extension of the standard FMEA format from MIL STD 1629A, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.

### 4.2.2 Failure rates

The failure modes used in this analysis are from the *exida* Electrical Component Reliability Handbook (see [N2]). The failure rates used in this analysis are the basic failure rates from the Siemens standard SN 29500 (see [N3]). The rates were chosen in a way that is appropriate for safety integrity level verification calculations and the intended applications. It is expected that the actual number of field failures due to random events will be less than the number predicted by these failure rates.

For hardware assessment according to IEC 61508 only random equipment failures are of interest. It is assumed that the equipment has been properly selected for the application and is adequately commissioned such that early life failures (infant mortality) may be excluded from the analysis.

Failures caused by external events should be considered as random failures. Examples of such failures are loss of power or physical abuse.

The assumption is also made that the equipment is maintained per the requirements of IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 and therefore a preventative maintenance program is in place to replace equipment before the end of its “useful life”.

The user of these numbers is responsible for determining their applicability to any particular environment. Some industrial plant sites have high levels of stress. Under those conditions the failure rate data is adjusted to a higher value to account for the specific conditions of the plant.

Accurate plant specific data may be used for this purpose. If a user has data collected from a good proof test reporting system such as *exida* SILStat™ that indicates higher failure rates, the higher numbers shall be used.

### 4.2.3 Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output.

- Failure rates are constant, wear out mechanisms are not included.
- Propagation of failures is not relevant.
- Sufficient tests are performed prior to shipment to verify the absence of vendor and/or manufacturing defects that prevent proper operation of specified functionality to product specifications or cause operation different from the design analyzed.
- Practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDA and the diagnostic coverage provided by the automatic diagnostics.
- The correct parameterization is verified by the user.
- The safety accuracy for all configurations is 2% of full span.
- The device is locked against unintended operation/modification.
- The worst-case diagnostic test rate and reaction time is 60s.
- External power supply failure rates are not included.
- The Mean Time To Restoration (MTTR) is considered to be 24 hours.
- The Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output are installed per the manufacturer's instructions.
- The listed failure rates are valid for operating stress conditions typical of an industrial field environment with temperature limits within the manufacturer's rating and an average temperature over a long period of time of 40°C. For higher average temperatures, the failure rates should be multiplied with an experience-based factor of e.g. 1.5 for 50°C, 2.5 for 60°C and 5 for 80°C.
- Only the described variants are used for safety applications.
- The application program in the safety logic solver is configured according to NAMUR NE43 to detect under-range and over-range failures and does not automatically trip on these failures; therefore, these failures have been classified as dangerous detected failures.
- All components that are not part of the safety function (e.g. HART circuitry) and cannot influence the safety function (feedback immune) are excluded.

### 4.3 Results

$$DC = \lambda_{DD} / (\lambda_{DD} + \lambda_{DU})$$

$$\lambda_{total} = \lambda_{SD} + \lambda_{SU} + \lambda_{DD} + \lambda_{DU}$$

According to IEC 61508 the architectural constraints of an element must be determined. This can be done by following the 1<sub>H</sub> approach according to 7.4.4.2 of IEC 61508-2 or the 2<sub>H</sub> approach according to 7.4.4.3 of IEC 61508-2.

The 1<sub>H</sub> approach involves calculating the Safe Failure Fraction for the entire element.

The 2<sub>H</sub> approach involves assessment of the reliability data for the entire element according to 7.4.4.3.3 of IEC 61508-2.

This assessment supports the 1<sub>H</sub> approach.

According to 3.6.15 of IEC 61508-4, the Safe Failure Fraction is the property of a safety related element that is defined by the ratio of the average failure rates of safe plus dangerous detected failures and safe plus dangerous failures. This ratio is represented by the following equation:

$$SFF = (\sum \lambda_S \text{ avg} + \sum \lambda_{DD} \text{ avg}) / (\sum \lambda_S \text{ avg} + \sum \lambda_{DD} \text{ avg} + \sum \lambda_{DU} \text{ avg})$$

When the failure rates are based on constant failure rates, as in this analysis, the equation can be simplified to:

$$SFF = (\sum \lambda_S + \sum \lambda_{DD}) / (\sum \lambda_S + \sum \lambda_{DD} + \sum \lambda_{DU})$$

Where:

$\lambda_S$  = Fail Safe

$\lambda_{DD}$  = Fail Dangerous Detected

$\lambda_{DU}$  = Fail Dangerous Undetected

As the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output is only one part of an element, the architectural constraints should be determined for the entire sensor element.

### 4.3.1 PR6437 with single sensor configuration

The FMEDA carried out on the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output under the assumptions described in section 4.2.3 and the definitions given in section 4.1 and 4.2 leads to the following failure rates:

**Table 5: Failure rates for PR6437 with single sensor configuration**

Failure category	IEC 61508:2010 <sup>15</sup> Failure rates (in FIT)
<b>Safe Detected (<math>\lambda_{SD}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Safe Undetected (<math>\lambda_{SU}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dangerous Detected (<math>\lambda_{DD}</math>)</b>	<b>452</b>
Dangerous Detected ( $\lambda_{dd}$ ); by internal diagnostics or indirectly <sup>16</sup>	369
High ( $\lambda_H$ ); detected by the logic solver	17
Low ( $\lambda_L$ ); detected by the logic solver	49
Annunciation Detected ( $\lambda_{AD}$ )	17
<b>Dangerous Undetected (<math>\lambda_{DU}</math>)</b>	<b>28</b>
Annunciation Undetected ( $\lambda_{AU}$ )	11
No effect ( $\lambda_{\#}$ )	216
No part ( $\lambda_{-}$ )	289
<b>Total failure rate of the safety function (<math>\lambda_{Total}</math>)</b>	<b>481</b>
<b>Safe failure fraction (SFF) <sup>17</sup></b>	<b>94%</b>
<b>DC</b>	<b>94%</b>
<b>SIL AC <sup>18</sup></b>	<b>SIL 2</b>

<sup>15</sup> It is assumed that practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDAs.

<sup>16</sup> "indirectly" means that these failures are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

<sup>17</sup> The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number listed is for reference only.

<sup>18</sup> SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety function can fulfill the required  $PFD_{AVG}$  / PFH value.

### 4.3.2 PR6437 with redundant sensor configuration

The FMEDA carried out on the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output under the assumptions described in section 4.2.3 and the definitions given in section 4.1 and 4.2 leads to the following failure rates.

In redundant sensor configuration, two sensors are measured and evaluated. The two results are compared; the output is set to the safe state if the difference between the evaluated values exceeds a defined limit.

**Table 6: Failure rates for PR6437 with redundant sensor configuration**

Failure category	IEC 61508:2010 <sup>19</sup> Failure rates (in FIT)
<b>Safe Detected (<math>\lambda_{SD}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Safe Undetected (<math>\lambda_{SU}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dangerous Detected (<math>\lambda_{DD}</math>)</b>	<b>495</b>
Dangerous Detected ( $\lambda_{dd}$ ); by internal diagnostics or indirectly <sup>20</sup>	410
High ( $\lambda_H$ ); detected by the logic solver	17
Low ( $\lambda_L$ ); detected by the logic solver	49
Annunciation Detected ( $\lambda_{AD}$ )	20
<b>Dangerous Undetected (<math>\lambda_{DU}</math>)</b>	<b>23</b>
Annunciation Undetected ( $\lambda_{AU}$ )	12
No effect ( $\lambda_{\#}$ )	269
No part ( $\lambda_{-}$ )	197
<b>Total failure rate of the safety function (<math>\lambda_{Total}</math>)</b>	<b>519</b>
<b>Safe failure fraction (SFF)<sup>21</sup></b>	<b>95%</b>
<b>DC</b>	<b>95%</b>
<b>SIL AC<sup>22</sup></b>	<b>SIL 2</b>

<sup>19</sup> It is assumed that practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDAs.

<sup>20</sup> "indirectly" means that these failures are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

<sup>21</sup> The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number listed is for reference only.

<sup>22</sup> SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety function can fulfill the required  $PFD_{AVG}$  / PFH value.

### 4.3.3 PR6437 with dual sensor configuration

The FMEDA carried out on the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output under the assumptions described in section 4.2.3 and the definitions given in section 4.1 and 4.2 leads to the following failure rates.

In dual sensor configuration, two sensors are measured. The evaluation of the signals includes a mathematical combination such as difference of two temperatures. The result of the evaluation is used to control the output.

**Table 7: Failure rates for PR6437 with dual sensor configuration**

Failure category	IEC 61508:2010 <sup>23</sup> Failure rates (in FIT)
<b>Safe Detected (<math>\lambda_{SD}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Safe Undetected (<math>\lambda_{SU}</math>)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Dangerous Detected (<math>\lambda_{DD}</math>)</b>	<b>472</b>
Dangerous Detected ( $\lambda_{dd}$ ); by internal diagnostics or indirectly <sup>24</sup>	386
High ( $\lambda_H$ ); detected by the logic solver	17
Low ( $\lambda_L$ ); detected by the logic solver	49
Annunciation Detected ( $\lambda_{AD}$ )	20
<b>Dangerous Undetected (<math>\lambda_{DU}</math>)</b>	<b>34</b>
Annunciation Undetected ( $\lambda_{AU}$ )	11
No effect ( $\lambda_{\#}$ )	258
No part ( $\lambda_{-}$ )	218
<b>Total failure rate of the safety function (<math>\lambda_{Total}</math>)</b>	<b>506</b>
<b>Safe failure fraction (SFF)<sup>25</sup></b>	<b>93%</b>
<b>DC</b>	<b>93%</b>
<b>SIL AC<sup>26</sup></b>	<b>SIL 2</b>

<sup>23</sup> It is assumed that practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects assumed during the FMEDAs.

<sup>24</sup> "indirectly" means that these failures are not necessarily detected by diagnostics but lead to either fail low or fail high failures depending on the transmitter setting and are therefore detectable.

<sup>25</sup> The complete sensor element will need to be evaluated to determine the overall Safe Failure Fraction. The number listed is for reference only.

<sup>26</sup> SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware architectural constraints for the corresponding SIL but does not imply all related IEC 61508 requirements are fulfilled. In addition it must be shown that the device has a suitable systematic capability for the required SIL and that the entire safety function can fulfill the required PFD<sub>AVG</sub> / PFH value.

## 5 Using the FMEDA results

Using the failure rate data displayed in section 4.3, and the failure rate data for the associated element devices, an average the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>AVG</sub>) calculation can be performed for the entire safety function.

Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>AVG</sub>) calculation uses several parameters, many of which are determined by the particular application and the operational policies of each site. Some parameters are product specific and the responsibility of the manufacturer. Those manufacturer specific parameters are given in this third-party report.

Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>AVG</sub>) calculation is the responsibility of the owner/operator of a process and is often delegated to the SIF designer. Product manufacturers can only provide a PFD<sub>AVG</sub> by making many assumptions about the application and operational policies of a site. Therefore, use of these numbers requires complete knowledge of the assumptions and a match with the actual application and site.

Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>AVG</sub>) calculation is best accomplished with *exida's* exSILentia tool. See Appendix C for a complete description of how to determine the Safety Integrity Level for an entire safety function. The mission time used for the calculation depends on the PFD<sub>AVG</sub> target and the useful life of the product. The failure rates for all the devices of the safety function are required to perform the PFD<sub>AVG</sub> calculation

The following section gives a simplified example on how to apply the results of the FMEDA.

### 5.1 Example PFD<sub>AVG</sub> / PFH calculation

An average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>AVG</sub>) calculation is performed for a single (1oo1) Temperature transmitter PR6437 with *exida's* exSILentia tool. The failure rate data used in this calculation are displayed in sections 4.3.1. A mission time of 10 and 15 years has been assumed, a Mean Time To Restoration of 24 hours and a maintenance capability of 100%. Table 8 shows the results. The example calculation has been done for the temperature transmitter in single configuration.

**Table 8: [V1] – PFD<sub>AVG</sub> / PFH values**

	PFH <sup>27</sup>	Mission Time	
		10 years	15 years
PR6437	PFH = 2.8E-08 1/h	PFD <sub>AVG</sub> = 1.24E-03	PFD <sub>AVG</sub> = 1.85 E-03

For SIL2 the overall PFD<sub>AVG</sub> shall be better than 1.00E-02 and the PFH shall be better than 1.00E-06 1/h. As the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output are contributing to the entire safety function they should only consume a certain percentage of the allowed range. Assuming 10% of this range as a reasonable budget they should be better than or equal to 1.00E-03 or 1.00E-07 1/h, respectively. The calculated PFH values is within the allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 of IEC 61508-1 and do fulfill the assumption to not claim more than 10% of the allowed range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 1.00E-07 1/h, respectively. The PFD<sub>AVG</sub> dependent on the Mission Time slightly exceeds the assumed 10% of the allowed range, i.e. 1.00E-03. But as it does not exceed 20% even for 15 years Mission Time, the device may be used also for SIL2 low demand application based on a careful consideration of the failure rates of the other elements in the loop.

<sup>27</sup> The PFH value is based on a worst-case diagnostic test rate and a reaction time of 60s. The ratio of the diagnostic test rate to the demand rate shall equal or exceed 100.

The resulting  $PFD_{AVG}$  graphs generated from the exSILentia tool for a Mission Time of 10 years without proof test is displayed in




Figure 4:  $PFD_{AVG}$  over time

## 6 Terms and Definitions

Automatic Diagnostics	Tests performed on line internally by the device or, if specified, externally by another device without manual intervention.
DC	Diagnostic Coverage of dangerous failures ( $DC = \lambda_{DD} / (\lambda_{DD} + \lambda_{DU})$ )
FIT	Failure In Time ( $1 \times 10^{-9}$ failures per hour)
FMEDA	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis
HFT	Hardware Fault Tolerance A hardware fault tolerance of N means that N+1 is the minimum number of faults that could cause a loss of the safety function.
High demand mode	Mode, where the safety function is only performed on demand, in order to transfer the EUC into a specified safe state, and where the frequency of demands is greater than one per year.
Low demand mode	Mode, where the safety function is only performed on demand, in order to transfer the EUC into a specified safe state, and where the frequency of demands is no greater than one per year.
MTBF	Mean Time Between Failures
MTTR	Mean Time To Restoration
$PFD_{AVG}$	Average Probability of Failure on Demand
PFH	Probability of dangerous Failure per Hour
SIF	Safety Instrumented Function
SIL	Safety Integrity Level IEC 61508: discrete level (one out of a possible four), corresponding to a range of safety integrity values, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest.
Type B element	“Complex” element (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2
T[Proof]	Proof Test Interval

## 7 Status of the document

### 7.1 Liability

*exida* prepares reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. *exida* accepts no liability whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general calculation methods are based.

Due to future potential changes in the standards, best available information and best practices, the current FMEDA results presented in this report may not be fully consistent with results that would be presented for the identical product at some future time. As a leader in the functional safety market place, *exida* is actively involved in evolving best practices prior to official release of updated standards so that our reports effectively anticipate any known changes. In addition, most changes are anticipated to be incremental in nature and results reported within the previous three year period should be sufficient for current usage without significant question.

Most products also tend to undergo incremental changes over time. If an *exida* FMEDA has not been updated within the last three years and the exact results are critical to the SIL verification you may wish to contact the product vendor to verify the current validity of the results.

### 7.2 Releases

Version History: V1R1: Replaced Appendix B with Proof Test; January 21 / 2026  
V1R0: Release; August 03 / 2020  
V0R1: Initial version; July 29 / 2020 – based on Report A/S 16/03-107-C R028


Authors: Philipp Hanzik – *exida.com* GmbH  
Review: V1R1: Jürgen Hochhaus, Jan 22, 2026  
V0R1: Mikal Jesper Nielsen – PR electronics A/S

Release status: Released

### 7.3 Release Signatures

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Hanzik", written over a horizontal line.

Philipp Hanzik, Safety Engineer

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "St. Aschenbrenner", written over a horizontal line.

Dipl.-Ing. (Univ.) Stephan Aschenbrenner, Partner, CEO

## Appendix A: Lifetime of Critical Components

According to section 7.4.9.5 of IEC 61508-2, a useful lifetime, based on experience, should be assumed.

Although a constant failure rate is assumed by the probabilistic estimation method (see section 4.2.3) this only applies provided that the useful lifetime<sup>28</sup> of components is not exceeded. Beyond their useful lifetime, the result of the probabilistic calculation method is meaningless, as the probability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is highly dependent on the component itself and its operating conditions.

This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve. Therefore, it is obvious that the  $PFD_{AVG}$  calculation is only valid for components which have this constant domain and that the validity of the calculation is limited to the useful lifetime of each component.

It is assumed that early failures are detected to a huge percentage during the installation period and therefore the assumption of a constant failure rate during the useful lifetime is valid.

The Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output do not contain components with reduced useful lifetime which are contributing to the dangerous undetected failure rate and therefore to the  $PFD_{AVG}$  calculation. Therefore, there is no limiting factor to the useful lifetime.

When plant experience indicates a shorter useful lifetime than indicated in this appendix, the number based on plant experience should be used.

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<sup>28</sup> Useful lifetime is a reliability engineering term that describes the operational time interval where the failure rate of a device is relatively constant. It is not a term which covers product obsolescence, warranty, or other commercial issues.

## Appendix B: Proof Tests to Reveal Dangerous Undetected Faults

According to section 7.4.5.2 f) of IEC 61508-2, proof tests shall be undertaken to reveal dangerous faults which are undetected by automatic diagnostic tests. This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected faults which have been noted during Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis can be detected during proof testing.

### B1: Suggested Proof Test

The suggested Proof Test consists of the following steps, as described in **Table 9**.

**Table 9 Suggested Proof Test – Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output**

Step	Action
1.	Bypass the safety PLC or take other appropriate action to avoid a false trip/measurement.
2.	Disconnect the input signal(s) from the input terminals and connect instead a simulator suited for simulating the actual input setup for each active input channel.
3.	Apply input value(s) to each active channel, corresponding to 0% and 100% output range.
4.	Observe whether the output acts as expected.
5.	Restore the input terminals to normal operation, i.e. re-connect the input signal(s).
6.	Measure the process value (temperature) at the connected input(s) and observe that the output current corresponds to the applied input value(s).
7.	Remove the bypass from the safety PLC or otherwise restore normal operation.

This test will detect approximately 90% of possible “DU” failures in the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output.

## Appendix C: Using the FMEDA results

The Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output together with a temperature sensing device become a temperature sensor assembly. Therefore, when using the results of this FMEDA in a SIL verification assessment, the failure rates and failure modes of the temperature sensing device must be considered.

In the following tables, resulting Safe Failure Fractions that are below 90% and therefore are not fulfilling the requirement of IEC61508-2:2010, Table 3 for complex devices with HFT = 0 for SIL2, are marked in red.

### Appendix C.1: PR6437 with thermocouple

The failure mode distributions for thermocouples vary in published literature but there is strong agreement that open circuit or “burn-out” failure is the dominant failure mode. While some estimates put this failure mode at 99%+, a more conservative failure rate distribution suitable for SIS applications is shown in Table 10 and Table 11 when thermocouples are supplied with the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output. The drift failure mode is primarily due to T/C aging. The Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output will detect a thermocouple burn-out failure and drive their output to the specified failure state.

**Table 10 Typical failure rates for thermocouples (with extension wire)**

<b><i>Thermocouple Failure Mode Distribution</i></b>	<b><i>Low Stress</i></b>	<b><i>High Stress</i></b>
Open Circuit (Burn-out)	900 FIT	18000 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error)	50 FIT	1000 FIT
Drift (Temperature measurement in error)	50 FIT	1000 FIT

**Table 11 Typical failure rates for thermocouples (close coupled)**

<b><i>Thermocouple Failure Mode Distribution</i></b>	<b><i>Low Stress</i></b>	<b><i>High Stress</i></b>
Open Circuit (Burn-out)	95 FIT	1900 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error)	4 FIT	80 FIT
Drift (Temperature measurement in error)	1 FIT	20 FIT

A complete temperature sensor assembly consisting of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output and a temperature sensing device can be modeled by considering a series subsystem where a failure occurs if there is a failure in either component. For such a system, failure rates are added. Assuming that the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output will go to the pre-defined alarm state on detected failures of the thermocouple, the failure rate contribution for the thermocouple is:

<b>Low stress environment (extension wire)</b>	<b>High stress environment (extension wire)</b>
$\lambda_{dd} = 900 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{dd} = 18000 \text{ FIT}$
$\lambda_{du} = 50 \text{ FIT} + 50 \text{ FIT} = 100 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{du} = 1000 \text{ FIT} + 1000 \text{ FIT} = 2000 \text{ FIT}$

<b>Low stress environment (close coupled)</b>	<b>High stress environment (close coupled)</b>
$\lambda_{dd} = 95 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{dd} = 1900 \text{ FIT}$
$\lambda_{du} = 4 \text{ FIT} + 1 \text{ FIT} = 5 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{du} = 80 \text{ FIT} + 20 \text{ FIT} = 100 \text{ FIT}$

This results in a failure rate distribution and SFF to:

**Table 12: PR6437 with thermocouple (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1353 FIT	128 FIT	91%

**Table 13: PR6437 with thermocouple (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	548 FIT	33 FIT	94%

**Table 14: PR6437 with thermocouple (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	18453 FIT	2028 FIT	90%

**Table 15: PR6437 with thermocouple (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2353 FIT	128 FIT	94%

## Appendix C.2: PR6437 with RTD

The failure mode distribution for an RTD also depends on the application with the key variables being stress level, RTD wire length and RTD type (2/3 wire or 4 wire). The key stress variables are high vibration and frequent temperature cycling as these are known to cause cracks in the substrate leading to broken lead connection welds. Failure rate distributions are shown in Table 16 to Table 19. The Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output will detect open circuit, short circuit and a certain percentage of drift RTD failures and drive their output to the specified failure state.

**Table 16 Typical failure rates for 4-Wire RTDs (with extension wire)**

<b>RTD Failure Mode Distribution</b>	<b>Low Stress</b>	<b>High Stress</b>
Open Circuit (Burn-out)	410 FIT	8200 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error)	20 FIT	400 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error)	70 FIT <sup>29</sup>	1400 FIT <sup>30</sup>

**Table 17 Typical failure rates for 4-Wire RTDs (close coupled)**

<b>RTD Failure Mode Distribution</b>	<b>Low Stress</b>	<b>High Stress</b>
Open Circuit (Burn-out)	41,5 FIT	830 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error)	2,5 FIT	50 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error)	6 FIT <sup>31</sup>	120 FIT <sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> It is assumed that 65 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.

<sup>30</sup> It is assumed that 1300 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.

<sup>31</sup> It is assumed that 3.5 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.

<sup>32</sup> It is assumed that 70 FIT are detectable if the 4-wire RTD is correctly used.

**Table 18 Typical failure rates for 2/3-Wire RTDs (with extension wire)**

<b>RTD Failure Mode Distribution</b>	<b>Low Stress</b>	<b>High Stress</b>
Open Circuit (Burn-out)	370,5 FIT	7410 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error)	9,5 FIT	190 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error)	95 FIT	1900 FIT

**Table 19 Typical failure rates for 2/3-Wire RTDs (close coupled)**

<b>RTD Failure Mode Distribution</b>	<b>Low Stress</b>	<b>High Stress</b>
Open Circuit (Burn-out)	37,92 FIT	758,4 FIT
Short Circuit (Temperature measurement in error)	1,44 FIT	28,8 FIT
Drift (Temperature Measurement in error)	8,64 FIT	172,8 FIT

A complete temperature sensor assembly consisting of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output and a temperature sensing device can be modeled by considering a series subsystem where a failure occurs if there is a failure in either component. For such a system, failure rates are added. Assuming that the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output will go to the pre-defined alarm state on a detected failure of the RTD, the failure rate contribution for the RTD is:

**4-wire RTD with extension wire:**

<b>Low stress environment</b>	<b>High stress environment</b>
$\lambda_{dd} = 410 \text{ FIT} + 20 \text{ FIT} + 65 \text{ FIT} = 495 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{dd} = 8200 \text{ FIT} + 400 \text{ FIT} + 1300 \text{ FIT} = 9900 \text{ FIT}$
$\lambda_{du} = 5 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{du} = 100 \text{ FIT}$

**4-wire RTD close coupled:**

<b>Low stress environment</b>	<b>High stress environment</b>
$\lambda_{dd} = 41.5 \text{ FIT} + 2.5 \text{ FIT} + 3.5 \text{ FIT} = 47.5 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{dd} = 830 \text{ FIT} + 50 \text{ FIT} + 70 \text{ FIT} = 950 \text{ FIT}$
$\lambda_{du} = 2.5 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{du} = 50 \text{ FIT}$

**2/3-wire RTD with extension wire:**

<b>Low stress environment</b>	<b>High stress environment</b>
$\lambda_{dd} = 370.5 \text{ FIT} + 9.5 \text{ FIT} = 380 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{dd} = 7410 \text{ FIT} + 190 \text{ FIT} = 7600 \text{ FIT}$
$\lambda_{du} = 95 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{du} = 1900 \text{ FIT}$

**2/3-wire RTD close coupled:**

<b>Low stress environment</b>	<b>High stress environment</b>
$\lambda_{dd} = 37.92 \text{ FIT} + 1.44 \text{ FIT} = 39.36 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{dd} = 758.4 \text{ FIT} + 28.8 \text{ FIT} = 787.2 \text{ FIT}$
$\lambda_{du} = 8.64 \text{ FIT}$	$\lambda_{du} = 172.8 \text{ FIT}$

This results in a failure rate distribution and SFF to:

**Table 20: PR6437 with 4-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	948 FIT	33FIT	96%

**Table 21: PR6437 with 4-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	500 FIT	31 FIT	94%

**Table 22: PR6437 with 4-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	10353 FIT	128 FIT	98%

**Table 23: PR6437 with 4-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1403 FIT	78 FIT	94%

**Table 24: PR6437 with 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	833 FIT	123 FIT	87%

**Table 25: PR6437 with 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	492 FIT	37 FIT	93%

**Table 26: PR6437 with 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	8053 FIT	1928 FIT	80%

**Table 27: PR6437 with 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1240 FIT	201 FIT	86%

### Appendix C.3: PR6437 in dual mode (TC, RTD or mixed sensor types)

This appendix shows the failure rates when the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output is used in “dual mode” with two temperature sensing devices connected to it.

To obtain the overall failure rates of the sensor assembly, use the failure rates of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output for dual mode and add failure rates of both temperature sensing devices. “Dual mode” indicates that two temperature sensing devices are combined to obtain one measurement value (e.g. the difference of two temperatures). The failure rates of both temperature sensing devices contribute fully to the overall failure rate and therefore have to be added both.

**Table 28: PR6437 with two thermocouples (low stress – with extension wire); dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2273 FIT	234 FIT	90%

**Table 29: PR6437 with two thermocouples (low stress – close coupled); dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	663 FIT	44 FIT	93%

**Table 30: PR6437 with two thermocouples (high stress – with extension wire); dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	36473 FIT	4034 FIT	90%

**Table 31: PR6437 with two thermocouples (high stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	4273	234	94%

**Table 32: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1233 FIT	224 FIT	85%

**Table 33: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled) , dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	552 FIT	52 FIT	91%

**Table 34: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire) , dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	15673 FIT	3834 FIT	80%

**Table 35: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled) , dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2047 FIT	380 FIT	84%

**Table 36: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1463 FIT	44 FIT	97%

**Table 37: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	568 FIT	39 FIT	94%

**Table 38: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	20273 FIT	234 FIT	98%

**Table 39: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2373 FIT	134 FIT	94%

**Table 40: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1753 FIT	229 FIT	88%

**Table 41: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	607 FIT	142 FIT	81%

**Table 42: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	26073 FIT	3934 FIT	86%

**Table 43: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	3160 FIT	2187 FIT	59%

**Table 44: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1868 FIT	89 FIT	95%

**Table 45: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	615 FIT	38 FIT	94%

**Table 46: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	28373 FIT	1134 FIT	96%

**Table 47: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	3323 FIT	104 FIT	97%

**Table 48: PR6437 with 2/3-wire and 4-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1348 FIT	134 FIT	90%

**Table 49: PR6437 with 2/3-wire and 4-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	560 FIT	46 FIT	92%

**Table 50: PR6437 with 2/3-wire and 4-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	17973 FIT	2034 FIT	89%

**Table 51: PR6437 with 2/3-wire and 4-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled), dual mode**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2210 FIT	257 FIT	89%

#### Appendix C.4: PR6437 in redundant mode (TC, RTD or mixed) with drift monitoring

This appendix shows the failure rates when the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output is used in redundant mode with two temperature sensing devices connected to it.

To obtain the overall failure rates of the sensor assembly, use the failure rates of the Temperature Transmitter PR6437 with 4..20mA output for redundant mode and add failure rates of both temperature sensing devices. The temperature sensing device failure rates should be adjusted to reflect the additional coverage (95%) on the normally undetected failures provided by the drift alarm.

**Table 52: PR6437 with two thermocouples (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2486 FIT	33 FIT	98%

**Table 53: PR6437 with two thermocouples (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	695 FIT	24 FIT	97%

**Table 54: PR6437 with two thermocouples (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	40296 FIT	223 FIT	99%

**Table 55: PR6437 with two thermocouples (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	4486 FIT	33 FIT	99%

**Table 56: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTDs (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1436 FIT	33 FIT	98%

**Table 57: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTDs (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	591 FIT	24 FIT	96%

**Table 58: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTDs (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	19306 FIT	213 FIT	99%

**Table 59: PR6437 with two 2/3-wire RTDs (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2398 FIT	40 FIT	98%

**Table 60: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTDs (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1495 FIT	24 FIT	98%

**Table 61: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTDs (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	595 FIT	23 FIT	96%

**Table 62: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTDs (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	20486 FIT	33 FIT	99%

**Table 63: PR6437 with two 4-wire RTDs (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	2491 FIT	28 FIT	98%

**Table 64: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1961 FIT	33 FIT	98%

**Table 65: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	634 FIT	28 FIT	95%

**Table 66: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	29801 FIT	218 FIT	99%

**Table 67: PR6437 with thermocouple and 2/3-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	3442 FIT	1301 FIT	96%

**Table 68: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (low stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	1990 FIT	28 FIT	98%

**Table 69: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (low stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	645 FIT	28 FIT	95%

**Table 70: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (high stress – with extension wire)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	30391 FIT	128 FIT	99%

**Table 71: PR6437 with thermocouple and 4-wire RTD (high stress – close coupled)**

$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	<b>SFF</b>
0 FIT	0 FIT	3488 FIT	125 FIT	96%